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Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of
Place
Naomi Schoenbaum
abstract. David Schleicher has written an important article on the relationship between
law and mobility, arguing for policymakers to be more concerned with policies that stand in the
way of individuals moving to bigger, more productive cities. This Response takes up the costs of
mobility for productivity, welfare, and sex equality omitted by Schleicher, and addresses Schleicher’s treatment of place as a market. It argues that Schleicher’s argument fails to account for
how mobility interacts with critical relationships. While Schleicher’s view of productivity is
premised in agglomeration economics, he ignores how mobility ruptures the very relationships
on which the beneﬁts of agglomeration (and broader welfare metrics) depend. He also misses
how moves o�en are not made by individuals, but rather by families, and neglects the fact that
such moves o�en entail losses for women. Finally, Schleicher’s treatment of place as a market,
where individuals should essentially move to the highest bidder, ignores how our attachments to
places run far deeper than the labor market opportunities they aﬀord.
introduction
Place is having a moment. Since the disorienting 2016 presidential election,
place has emerged as one of the primary explanations for why Washington
elites were so surprised by Trump’s victory: they were out of touch with voters
in faraway and quite diﬀerent places.1 Popular attention to place has been cap1.

See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, President Trump: How America Got It So Wrong, ROLLING STONE (Nov.
10, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/president-trump-how-america
-got-it-so-wrong-w449783 [http://perma.cc/D3CT-GS5Z]; J.D. Vance, Life Outside the Liberal Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election
-night-2016/life-outside-the-liberal-bubble [http://perma.cc/UP5Q-YS2N].
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tured by unlikely bestsellers, like J.D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy,2 which are premised on the diﬀerence place makes in America.3 Legal scholars have increasingly
emphasized how distinctions among diﬀerent places aﬀect legal questions.4 Relatedly, mobility, and especially mobility to certain types of places, has been
presented as the answer to our economic woes.5 It is not surprising, then, that
David Schleicher’s Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation6
comes at this moment. Stuck! is sure to become a seminal legal treatment of
place and mobility—topics at once both timely and timeless.
I take Stuck!’s essential argument to be as follows: law distorts the market
for moving to high-productivity places, and this is an undesirable outcome. For
Schleicher, mobility is important not only for welfare and productivity, but also
for macroeconomic goals like the eﬀectiveness of a single American currency.7
His concerns about stasis lie particularly with those whom he views as “stuck”
in less productive areas, who he believes would reap rewards from moving to

2.
3.

J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS (2016).
Other recent attention-getting books on the importance of place in America include AMY
GOLDSTEIN, JANESVILLE: AN AMERICAN STORY (2017); and ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD,
STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2016).

4.

See, e.g., Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2934481 [http://perma.cc/39PL-YYWJ]; Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2927714 [http://perma.cc/ENL5-SAHP]; David Fontana, Federal Decentralization,
VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3029180 [http://perma.cc/6A7G
-B4QW]; David Fontana, The Geography of Campaign Finance Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3008378 [http://perma.cc/A7V8-SP6L]
[hereina�er Fontana, Geography].

5.

See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, The Unseen Threat to America: We Don’t Leave Our Hometowns, TIME
(Feb. 22, 2017), http://time.com/4677919/tyler-cowen-book/?xid=time_socialﬂow_twitter
[http://perma.cc/4VRL-W54L]; Kevin D. Williamson, Chaos in the Family, Chaos in the
State: The White Working Class’s Dysfunction, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 17, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://
www.nationalreview.com/article/432876/donald-trump-white-working-class-dysfunction
-real-opportunity-needed-not-trump [http://perma.cc/6X7X-XCN5].

6.

David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78
(2017).

7.

Id. at 83 (“[T]he stickiness of America’s internal labor market is a fundamental macroeconomic problem that inﬂuences the quality of monetary policy, overall economic output and
growth, and the eﬃcacy of federal safety net spending.”).
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more productive areas.8 Schleicher argues for policymakers to be more mindful
of the ways in which law may distort labor markets by impeding mobility.9
With respect to the descriptive portion of his claim, Schleicher is appropriately circumspect about the causal relationship between law and recent declines
in mobility,10 particularly in light of research rebutting legal explanations for
the phenomenon and suggesting an alternative explanation.11 Nonetheless,
Schleicher assigns some blame to law for the relative stasis of the American
people.12 Note that the research is currently inconclusive on Schleicher’s view
of law’s causal role in this reduced movement, as Schleicher identiﬁes a broader
set of laws that impact mobility—including, for example, public beneﬁts laws
and municipal bankruptcy law—than the research has considered to this
point.13 Further, even if the laws that Schleicher faults for our declining mobili-

8.

Id. at 82 (“More troubling still, Americans are no longer moving from poor regions to rich
ones.”). As Schleicher acknowledges, the data is disputed as to whether lower-skilled workers make fewer interstate moves or whether they are just less likely to move to rich markets.
See id. at 116 n.157.

9.

See, e.g., id. at 126 (expressing concern about policies that could distort incentives to move
and thus create a “mismatch between the ‘natural’ needs of the labor market and the supply
of labor”).
10. Id. at 84 (explaining that “[i]t is not clear whether these legal changes caused declines in
mobility, or simply failed to push back against ‘natural’ changes that reduced mobility,” and
citing studies that assign causation to reasons other than law). Law’s relationship to longdistance mobility is more mixed than Schleicher suggests. Whole areas of law might be seen
as pro-mobility. Employment law, for example, greases the wheels for labor-market mobility: the portability of employer-provided health insurance, antidiscrimination laws, unemployment insurance, and even at-will employment all make it easier to move long distances
for a better job. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169, 1177-87
(2012). Once one recognizes, as Schleicher rightly does, that so many laws and policies impact mobility directly or indirectly, see, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 6, at 111 n.143, it is quite
hard to identify the net impact of law on mobility.
11.

See, e.g., Raven Molloy et al., Declining Migration Within the U.S.: The Role of the Labor Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20065, 2014), http://www.nber.org
/papers/w20065.pdf [http://perma.cc/23AM-4ZCC] [hereina�er Molloy et al., Declining
Migration] (attributing declining mobility to changes in the labor market itself, speciﬁcally
to declining labor market ﬂuidity); Raven Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity in
the U.S. Labor Market, 2016 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 221-23, http://www
.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/molloytextspring16bpea.pdf [http://perma
.cc/B58Z-XQMX] [hereina�er Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity] (rejecting
housing or labor market regulations as explanations for declining labor market ﬂuidity).
12. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 84-85 (“[S]tate and local policies in part dictate where people
move, particularly by keeping people out of the richest metropolitan areas and best job markets . . . . [S]tate, local, and federal laws therefore bear some responsibility for declining interstate mobility.”).
13. Compare id. at 78 (noting that “legal barriers to interstate mobility” include “[l]and-use laws
and occupational licensing regimes,” “[d]iﬀerent eligibility standards for public beneﬁts,
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ty are not to blame, policymakers might be able to better spur mobility by using diﬀerent laws and policies. For these reasons, I set aside Schleicher’s descriptive claim and focus this Response on the article’s normative stance: how policymakers should approach policies that impact location decisions, assuming
that they can eﬀectively do so.
Schleicher and I agree on three main points: ﬁrst, place and mobility matter; second, policymakers too infrequently consider place and mobility; and
third, relationships are critical for productivity. Despite these points of agreement, there is much that I ﬁnd missing from Schleicher’s account. Schleicher’s
aim of moving people from low-productivity places to high-productivity places
relies on mistaken premises about the signiﬁcance of both mobility and place.
As for the signiﬁcance of mobility,14 Schleicher fails to appreciate how, because
we o�en move in nuclear family units, mobility ruptures relationships outside
these units that prove critical for our productivity15 and our happiness16—and
how, due to gendered family dynamics in heterosexual couples, the gains mobility does produce are distributed in sex-unequal ways.17 As for the signiﬁcance of place, Schleicher may overstate the value of place for productivity
while at the same time ignoring the value of place for general welfare, politics,
and a host of other considerations.18
This Response proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I explain Schleicher’s view
of location decisions as a market for place. In Parts II and III, I argue that this
stance leads Schleicher to err with regard to the costs of mobility and the value
of place, respectively.

public employee pension policies, homeownership subsidies, state and local tax regimes,”
“basic property law rules,” “building codes, mobile home bans, federal location-based subsidies, legal constraints on knocking down houses, and the problematic structure of Chapter 9
municipal bankruptcy”), with Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity, supra note 11, at
221-23 (addressing “regulation of land use and business practices,” relying on composite ratings of regulation to assess the relationship between regulation and mobility, and separately
rejecting occupational licensing as a causal factor).
14. For an article-length treatment of the costs of mobility and their relationship to employment
law and family law, see Schoenbaum, supra note 10.
15. See infra Section II.A.
16.

See infra Section II.B.
17. See infra Section II.C.
18.

See infra Section III.
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i. a market for pl ace
Schleicher thinks it is a “problem[]” that people are currently “stuck” in
relatively unproductive places.19 He suggests that more of these people should
move to more productive places,20 and he argues that doing so “would substantially increase economic activity and welfare.”21 Given these beneﬁts, he does
not think that the people who are stuck (or anyone else) would have any interest in their staying put.22
Schleicher’s view of the importance of place stems from agglomeration economics. As Schleicher explains, agglomeration economics focuses on proximity’s role in productivity.23 When people and capital come together geographically, they can exchange things and ideas more easily, and this produces wealth
and economic growth.24 Three mechanisms generate these gains: (1) a reduction in shipping costs for goods; (2) the advantages of deep markets; and (3)
information spillovers between neighbors.25 Given that the cost of transporting
goods has dropped but the cost of transporting people remains high, the primary beneﬁts of agglomeration are now the beneﬁts of co-locating people:
deep labor and consumption markets, and information spillovers inside and
between industries.26 Therefore, according to Schleicher, increasing the ability
of people to move to dense boomtowns would increase gains through agglomeration.27
Importantly, in describing the beneﬁts of agglomeration, Schleicher relies
not only on the fact that people are brought together in the same places, but
that these persons develop relationships that allow information to be shared.28
As he explains:

19.

See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 86.

20.

See, e.g., id. at 83 (speaking favorably of “[i]ncreasing interstate migration rates, and particularly moves to rich regions”); id. at 152-53 (proposing mobility incentive programs).

21.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 143 (“It is not clear why the country as a whole or a state in particular should want residents to remain in, say, Atlantic City rather than move to the New York City suburbs,
which would give them access to a better labor market.”).

22.

23.
24.

Id. at 96-97.
See id.

25.

See id. at 97.
26. See id. at 100.
27.
28.
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See id. at 101-02.
See id. at 103 (“More frequent interactions between people can lead to new ideas, and these
ideas drive economic growth.”).
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In Silicon Valley, for example, so�ware developers and venture capitalists learn just by having coﬀee with friends. A tech savant in Jacksonville, Florida would have no such opportunity to learn from peers. Lobbyists in D.C. learn from one another over dinner in Capitol Hill,
becoming better at their jobs with each bit of gossip or scrap of insight
into legislative procedure. Wall Street types learn about how to structure deals over steaks and cocktails at The 21 Club.29
Schleicher views location choice through the lens of a market for matching
people with place. To maximize productivity, Schleicher wants to move people
to the most productive places. He importantly, and rightly, emphasizes the role
of certain market relations for productivity. But he stops short of recognizing
the full role of relationships for productivity, general welfare, and the distribution of economic gains and losses, as well as how mobility aﬀects these relationships.
For Schleicher, relationships matter only for the economic gains they bring
rather than for the other beneﬁts they might confer or the value they may have
even in their own right. He does say a few words about the noneconomic beneﬁts of relationships, but these beneﬁts feature nowhere in his policy prescriptions.30 Because Schleicher focuses on the economic impact of relationships,
only certain relationships—a subset of market relations—end up mattering,
while the rest, including the family, are ignored. Even when it comes to market
relations, Schleicher fails to appreciate how their disruption through mobility
undermines their economic function. Moreover, under his view, place matters
only for the proximity it provides to other economic actors. Place, rather than
constituting a meaningful community, is fungible.
This circumscribed view of relationships means that Schleicher misses the
full costs, economic and otherwise, of his proposal. First, as to the costs of mobility, Schleicher criticizes other agglomerationists for wrongly assuming fric-

29.

Id. at 100. The fact that these examples are all stereotypically masculine might suggest something about whom Schleicher envisions as the prototypical mover. The gendered dimensions of mobility are discussed infra Section II.C.

30.

See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 109 (“Beyond generating wealth through increased investment, geographic stability may support the development of beneﬁcial social values and relationships. Stable communities can strengthen intergenerational bonds, with grandparents
living near grandchildren. Long-term friendships may be more likely to endure in stable
communities than in transient ones. In such communities, social capital can more easily develop.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 123 (“We make friends, build social networks, and raise
our families where we live.”).
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tionless or near-frictionless labor mobility.31 But he fails to consider the frictions that arise from relationships. The importance of strong local ties means
that mobility can undermine productivity and broader welfare metrics. And the
fact that we move in family units means that mobility imposes undesirable
gendered distributional consequences.
Second, as to the value of place, Schleicher fails to see how the spillovers
celebrated by agglomerationists are not just economic, but also political and
ideological.32 Places, in other words, are particular. This means that moving
people from one place to another can have a signiﬁcant impact on general welfare, as well as for politics. This broader signiﬁcance of place might mean that
we do not want to treat it just like any other market good.
ii. the costs of mobility
This Part spells out the costs of mobility that Schleicher overlooks due to
his inattention to the impact of mobility on our relationships, both inside and
outside the family. First, Schleicher fails to appreciate how mobility can reduce
productivity by breaking the ties that generate it. Second, Schleicher fails to
consider how mobility can undermine other aspects of welfare promoted by
place-based relationships. Third, Schleicher fails to account for the disproportionate costs that an emphasis on long-distance mobility imposes on women.
A. Productivity
As Schleicher quite rightly recognizes, relationships between people, and
especially geographically proximate relationships, are essential for productivity.
But precisely because of the importance of these relationships, mobility can undermine productivity by weakening and even breaking these ties. Mobility has
productivity costs both for a person’s original location, which has lost part of its
network, and for that person’s new location, as regenerating ties takes time.
This Section explains how mobility harms productivity as a result.

31.

See id. at 101 (noting that agglomeration models assume that “ﬁrms and people can cheaply
and easily move their base of location,” and thus “[w]hen there is local economic growth,
people move in”).
32. Schleicher cites Alfred Marshall as the canonical exponent of agglomeration economics. Id.
at 97. Marshall’s theory of spillovers also explains how places diﬀer across important dimensions, including politically. See Fontana, Geography, supra note 4, at 107 n.24 (explaining that
when people are physically proximate “‘[t]he mysteries of the trade become no mysteries;
but are as it were in the air’”) (quoting ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 271
(8th ed. 1920)).
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Agglomerationists like Schleicher are insuﬃciently attentive to the nature
of the ties that promote particular types of productivity. Sociologists have distinguished between “weak” and “strong” ties. Weak ties concern those who are
essentially acquaintances, while strong ties involve closer friends.33 Weak ties
serve important functions in the market and otherwise, by transmitting simple
information (like job opportunities) and linking together networks of similar
weak ties.34 But there are some things that only strong ties can do. Strong ties
are based in reciprocity and trust, and thus allow for exchange and reliance in
the absence of formal contract.35 This closer relationship allows strong ties to
transmit complex and sensitive information.36
As a result, strong ties, both within and outside a worker’s ﬁrm, are critical
for productivity. Schleicher’s description of the beneﬁts of agglomeration recognizes this. Recall the “so�ware developers and venture capitalists [who]
learn just by having coﬀee with friends,” the “[l]obbyists in D.C. [who] learn
from one another over dinner in Capitol Hill,” and the “Wall Street types
[who] learn about how to structure deals over steaks and cocktails at The 21
Club.”37
Even beyond agglomeration economics, economic sociology recognizes the
role of strong ties in productivity.38 Inside the workplace, coworkers provide
access to information, power, and opportunities, all of which enhance performance.39 Strong workplace ties promote commitment to the ﬁrm, which increases organizational citizenship behavior, loyalty, and willingness to give back

33.

Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361 (1973) (describing
the “intuitive notion of the ‘strength’ of an interpersonal tie” as a function of “the amount of
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual conﬁding), and the reciprocal services
which characterize the tie”).

34.

Id. at 1360.
See Edward Glaeser et al., An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. F437, F437
(2002).
36. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY
201, 218-19 (1983).
37. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 100.
35.

38.

VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY 242 (2011) (reviewing the literature and concluding that “intimacy within an organization fosters job satisfaction, enhances commitment of workers to the organization, facilitates communication
among workers, and supports mutual aid in the performance of essential organizational
tasks”). For work bringing this literature into legal scholarship, see Naomi Schoenbaum,
The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167 (2015) [hereina�er Schoenbaum, Intimate
Work]; Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605 (2017) [hereina�er Schoenbaum, Coworkers].

39.

See Schoenbaum, Coworkers, supra note 38, at 612-14.
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to the employer.40 Strong workplace ties also provide emotional support and
care that can contribute to performance.41 Strong ties with coworkers even
serve as a bulwark against workplace harassment, and can help workers better
cope with harassment or mistreatment if it occurs.42 From call center workers
to security analysts, strongly tied coworkers outperform their peers,43 and this
success accrues to the ﬁrm.44
Apart from coworkers, close work relationships with customers and even
with competitors are also important for productivity.45 As I have addressed in
prior work on intimate relationships between workers and customers, these relationships lead workers and customers alike “to act altruistically,” performing
additional work to support one another and sharing private information that
aids in work success.46 Strong ties between workers and customers support
price premiums, decrease employee training costs, and reduce turnover, all of

40.

See id. (collecting studies); ZELIZER, supra note 38, at 242-48 (same).

41.

See Schoenbaum, Coworkers, supra note 38, at 613; ZELIZER, supra note 38, at 246 (concluding, based on a range of research documenting the signiﬁcance of emotional support exchanged by coworkers, that “[w]ithout such close personal ties, we can infer, many workplaces, far from operating more eﬃciently, would actually collapse”).

42.

See Schoenbaum, Coworkers, supra note 38, at 621-25 (citing studies).
See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note 38, at 252 (ﬁnding that “a surprising variety of studies document the positive eﬀects of workplace intimate relationships on economic productivity”);
Susan Ellingwood, The Collective Advantage, GALLUP BUS. J. (Sept. 15, 2001), http://www
.gallup.com/businessjournal/787/collective-advantage.aspx [http://perma.cc/E7RZ-LYVU]
(citing a large poll ﬁnding a strong correlation across ﬁrms between the proportion of workers with on-the-job “best friends” and the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and productivity); Boris
Groysberg et al., The Risky Business of Hiring Stars, HARV. BUS. REV. 1 (2004) (ﬁnding that
standout performance by security analysts relies substantially on collaboration with colleagues such that stars frequently experience declines in productivity a�er switching ﬁrms);
Benjamin N. Waber et al., Productivity Through Coﬀee Breaks: Changing Social Networks by
Changing Break Structure, MASS. INST. TECH. MEDIA LAB. (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1586375 [http://perma.cc/N8YV-UDJL] (ﬁnding, in a study of call center workers, that
the strength of a worker’s social group was positively related to productivity in the form of
average call handle time); Lynn Wu et al., Mining Face-To-Face Interaction Networks Using
Sociometric Badges: Predicting Productivity in an IT Conﬁguration Task, INT’L CONFERENCE INFO. SYS. (2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130251 [http://perma.cc/XQ48-ZWUJ] (ﬁnding
that workers at an information technology company who completed tasks within a tightknit group that communicated face to face were about 30% more productive than those who
did not communicate in a face-to-face network).

43.

44.

ZELIZER, supra note 38, at 242 (reviewing literature and concluding that intimacy “promotes
organizational performance”).

45.

See id. at 243 (collecting citations ﬁnding the importance of friendship among contractors
and “even putative competitors”).

46.

Schoenbaum, Intimate Work, supra note 38, at 1180.
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which contributes to higher proﬁts.47 Strong ties can lead to lower interest
rates on loans and lower billing rates from corporate lawyers to their clients.48
And strong ties outside of work matter for productivity, too. Whether through
the market or personal relationships, strong ties support caregiving for children, the elderly, or the disabled, which is crucial for workplace productivity,
especially for women.49 Even for someone who is unemployed and thus without strong coworker ties, these other strong work and nonwork ties can provide the connections and care that enable that person to ﬁnd a new job.
Mobility undermines strong ties because, as Schleicher recognizes, place
matters. People bound by stronger ties tend to live nearer to one another.50
Physical proximity is key to exchanges of support across strong ties.51 Assistance and frequency of contact increase when people are within close geographic range.52 Technology has not changed the importance of proximity in realizing the beneﬁts of strong ties. Despite email, Facebook, and even phone calls,
distance weakens relationships.53 While the internet helps to maintain contact
with weak ties, relationships’ sensitivity to distance has been similar pre- and
post-internet, and a person’s most active ties are still nearby.54 Facebook and
other “friendships” maintained through technology have little in common with
true friendship: they are devoid of the closeness that is the hallmark of a strong
tie.55

47.
48.

Id. at 1181.
Id.

49.

See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1195-96.
50. Id. at 1196-97.
51.

See id.; M. Mahdi Roghanizad & Vanessa K. Bohns, Ask in Person: You’re Less Persuasive Than
You Think Over Email, 69 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 224 (2017) (ﬁnding far higher response rates when soliciting participation when solicitation is face-to-face rather than
via email); Wu et al., supra note 43, at 16.

52.

Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1169; see also Alan R. Teo et al., Does Mode of Contact with
Diﬀerent Types of Social Relationships Predict Depression in Older Adults? Evidence from a Nationally Representative Survey, 63 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2014, 2019-21 (2015) (ﬁnding that
in-person contact reduces risk of depression far more than phone or email contact).

53.

See Diana Mok et al., Does Distance Matter in the Age of the Internet?, 47 URB. STUD. 2747,
2750, 2778 (2010) (explaining that the telephone and the internet tend to “work synergistically with face-to-face contact” to supplement rather than replace it, and that e-mail frequently serves to arrange visits and calls).

54.

Id. at 2775, 2779-80.
See SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY AND
LESS FROM EACH OTHER (2011); William Deresiewicz, Faux Friendship, CHRON. REV.
(Dec. 6, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Faux-Friendship/49308 [http://perma.cc
/CTA2-9D2K].

55.
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Strong times require time to generate.56 When a worker moves, those in
the original location suﬀer the loss of a strong tie until they develop a new one,
and the mover similarly suﬀers the loss of strong ties until she too develops
new ones. The long-distance mover loses not only her coworkers, but also her
local professional circle. Upon starting work in the new location, the mover will
be considered an “outsider” who does not have the legitimacy to reap the beneﬁts of strong ties.57 The stress of the move itself and the time spent rebuilding
ties also cuts into the mover’s productivity.58 This all makes it harder to perform optimally in the new workplace, at least for some time.59
Firms suﬀer too. Strong ties create a network of coworkers, customers, contractors, and consultants that beneﬁt the ﬁrm. These networks form structurally embedded relations—basically, an intricate web of routinized transactions
that reduce transaction costs, saving time and money.60 Moving imposes the
loss of a departing employee’s relationships and routines, adding to turnover
and training costs.61 While a ﬁrm might still beneﬁt from its connections to a
former employee through referrals and the like, these beneﬁts wane when an
employee is no longer in the ﬁrm’s local professional community.
B. General Welfare
Mobility’s impact on strong ties has broader eﬀects on welfare beyond the
economic.62 Strong ties communicate feelings of value and a sense of “be-

56.

See Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, supra note 33, at 1361 (explaining that tie strength
turns expressly on “the amount of time” the parties have been tied, as well as things that
tend to take time to develop, such as “emotional intensity,” “intimacy (mutual conﬁding),”
and “reciprocal services”).

57.

Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1209.
Id. at 1207-08.

58.
59.

See Groysberg et al., supra note 43, at 2 (ﬁnding declines in productivity in high-performing
security analysts a�er switching ﬁrms for this reason).

60.

Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1206.
61. Id. at 1206-07.
62.
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I do not mean to suggest that strong ties bring only beneﬁts. Strong ties bring not just more
support, but also more demands. The demands of strong ties are especially concerning for
low-income populations, for whom strong ties may crowd out the development of weak ties
and their particular beneﬁts, and for women, who are disproportionately burdened by the
demands of strong ties. There are features of strong ties, like returns to scale and interconnectivity, that guard against their burdens. For further discussion weighing the costs and
beneﬁts of strong ties, see id. at 1197-98. My point here is that even with the costs of strong
ties, policymakers should consider the damage to strong ties that long-distance mobility
imposes.
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long[ing] to a network of communication and mutual obligation.”63 They
promote self-esteem and happiness, as well as physical and mental health.64
They also deﬁne who we are by helping to maintain a consistent sense of identity throughout one’s life course.65
Strong ties also play a critical role in supporting caregiving. The majority of
children under school age receive care from sources beyond their parents,
whether from nonmarket strong ties, such as extended family, or from market
strong ties, such as daycare teachers.66 Strong ties also provide essential care for
the elderly and disabled.67 Beyond the care they provide to dependents, strong
ties also provide emotional support to primary caregivers, disproportionately
women.68 A grandmother may not only provide essential care for a grandchild,
but also for the grandchild’s mother, by serving as a sounding board and
providing advice. Mobility most jeopardizes this type of strong-tie support for
precisely those low-wage persons Schleicher thinks should be moving more. It
is those with the fewest resources who rely the most on nonmarket caregivers
(family members and friends), and who would have the hardest time replacing
these caregivers in a faraway location.69
Schleicher does reference some of the “beneﬁcial social values and relationships” associated with stability.70 He assigns little value to them because, to
him, “[t]he large majority of gains from population stability are captured by
the communities in which people stay put and not by the rest of the nation.”71
It is diﬃcult to calculate the positive impact of strong ties, such as decreased
healthcare costs, the value of care provided, sheer happiness, and so on. But
several points are worth noting. First, some of these gains, like decreased
healthcare costs, beneﬁt the nation as a whole. Second, the communities where
people stay put—which are all across the country—are part of the nation. Final63.

Id. at 1195 (quoting Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 655 (2007)).
64. Id.
65.
66.

Id.
See id.

67.

See Peggie R. Smith, Aging and Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid Domesticity in the TwentyFirst Century, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2007) (describing households “usher[ing] workers
into their homes to help care for aging family members” and disabled family members).
68. Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1195-96.
69.
70.

71.

Id.
Schleicher, supra note 6, at 109 (“[G]eographic stability may support the development of
beneﬁcial social values and relationships. Stable communities can strengthen intergenerational bonds, with grandparents living near grandchildren. Long-term friendships may be
more likely to endure in stable communities than in transient ones.” (footnotes omitted));
id. at 123 (“We make friends, build social networks, and raise our families where we live.”).
Id. at 111.
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ly, to the extent that Schleicher argues that we should or even can avoid the fact
that the beneﬁts of stasis accrue to the communities where people stay put, he
misses the point. The beneﬁts of a community of strong ties come precisely
from the fact that it is rooted in place.
Finally, there may be diﬀerent moving “types”—those who signiﬁcantly invest in community would stand to lose more a�er a move than those who do
not. These costs may be endogenous: if you are a “moving” type, you will not
invest in community, and you will reduce the losses associated with mobility; if
you are a “community” type, you will invest, and you will stand to lose more.
And it may be that precisely those persons that Schleicher thinks should move
more are community types—either by necessity72 or by choice—for whom
moving would be especially costly.
C. Distribution
Schleicher’s emphasis on the importance of certain market relationships
further means he ignores a crucial aspect of moving: we o�en do not do it
alone. Rather, we frequently move in family units.73 When dual-income heterosexual couples move long distances for employment purposes, the spouses
usually do not both accrue employment advantages. Rather, there is typically a
spouse whose work is advantaged by the move (the driving spouse) and a
spouse who may have either no job or a worse job in the new location (the
trailing spouse).74
While moving destroys economically relevant strong ties even for the driving spouse, it also typically provides economic beneﬁts to that person, as well
as an opportunity to recreate these ties over time. Because the trailing spouse
typically does not enjoy employment beneﬁts from the move and may be unemployed in the new location, her opportunities to regenerate strong ties are
hampered.75 Over time, the relative distribution of moving costs and beneﬁts
within the family becomes more lopsided.76 The beneﬁts the driving spouse
72.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text on the greater negative impact of mobility on
those who rely on nonmarket strong-tie support.

73.

See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1187-93 (explaining how the law plays a role in this).
While my focus here is on other adults within a family, children may also disproportionately
bear the costs of mobility. See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 111 & n.141 (citing a study showing
higher adult suicide rates for those who moved as children); Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at
1196 (noting that children beneﬁt from stable strong ties that are ruptured by mobility).
74. The alternatives of a long-distance marriage or long-distance commuting have their own
costs. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1214.
75. See id.
76.
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See id. at 1215.
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gains and the losses the trailing spouse suﬀers tend to set up relative investments in work and family (with the driving spouse investing more in work and
the trailing spouse investing more in family) that only further compound the
impact of the move.77
These family mobility dynamics have gendered consequences. In oppositesex couples, husbands tend to drive, and wives tend to trail.78 Wives are not
only more likely to be the trailing spouse when a family moves, but they themselves are also less likely to relocate for enhanced employment opportunities.79
This results in dramatic income diﬀerentials between husbands and wives in
heterosexual couples. Whereas long-distance mobility enhances husbands’ careers, mobility brings lower levels of employment and income growth for
wives.80 When these couples move, the income gap between husbands and
wives widens substantially, on average to nearly $3,000.81 Indeed, the impact
of a move is similar to the birth of a child on husbands’ and wives’ relative
earnings.82 Even a small income gap can grow quite wide over time.83
Importantly, evidence supports the existence of this trend—that oppositesex couples give priority to husbands’ careers in making relocation decisions—
even when controlling for human capital investments.84 Wives’ earning potential has little inﬂuence on the eﬀect of mobility on their employment, and, unlike men, mobility decreases women’s likelihood of employment.85 Indeed,
women who are most committed to work—both those who work long hours
and those who are their family’s sole earner—face the greatest earnings penalty
from family mobility because they have the most to lose.86 Therefore, sex, apart
from purely economic calculations, plays a signiﬁcant role in relocation decisions. As a result, we should be worried that mobility subsidies of the sort that
77.

See id.

78.

See id. (ﬁnding that husbands’ jobs are more likely to determine residential location, and
wives are more likely to leave a job to accommodate a partner’s job change). Existing research is on heterosexual couples. Gay and lesbian couples may develop the same dynamics
of a driving and trailing spouse for the reasons explained above, without the same gendered
consequences. Cf. Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
721 (2012) (arguing that the law of marriage continues to encourage role-specialization of
spouses, even though it now does so in a sex-neutral way).
79. Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1215-16.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1217.

84.

Id. at 1216.
85. Id.
86.

Id. at 1216-17.
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Schleicher proposes would compromise not only gender equality, but also eﬃcient location decisions.
Schleicher acknowledges the possibility of mobility’s “doleful distributional
consequences inside families,” but suggests that such consequences would be
far more (or perhaps entirely) palatable if the gains that husbands tend to accrue from mobility were shi�ed to wives to make up for the losses they tend to
suﬀer.87 While Schleicher does not spell out what form this would take, we
might imagine that a�er a move to a place where a husband gets a better job
and a wife ends up unemployed, the husband shi�s something of value to the
wife, which could be money (e.g., buying her a car), time (e.g., doing the
laundry), or authority (e.g., letting her choose their vacation).
Schleicher says that “[t]o know how costs are borne among family members, we would need to know a lot more about the state of negotiating power
inside families and how it aﬀects other aspects of interfamilial negotiation.”88
Everything we know about the gendered distribution of resources within the
family should make us skeptical that the gains and losses mobility generates
are, or will be, redistributed to alleviate their gendered impact.89 If anything,
we should expect that the work beneﬁts that husbands disproportionately gain
a�er a move will make them more likely to continue accruing such gains, and
that the losses that wives disproportionately suﬀer a�er a move will make them
more likely to continue suﬀering such losses, only enhancing the lopsidedness
of the spouses’ bargaining power.90 And even if a wife’s workplace losses were
oﬀset by gains inside the family, many marriages end in divorce, where these

87.

Schleicher, supra note 6, at 110 & n.139 (“It should be noted that these costs do not necessarily match actual ‘incidence’ inside families, any more than an employer paying a payroll
tax rather than an employee means that the employer bears the economic cost of the tax.”).
88. Id. at 110 n.139.
89.

See Amartya K. Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conﬂicts, in PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: WOMEN
AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 123, 124-26 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990) (noting that intrafamily divisions of resources o�en disfavor women’s well-being because, among other reasons, women’s contribution to family (non-market) production is o�en undervalued, and women tend
to sacriﬁce their own well-being for their family’s well-being).
90. Id. at 137 (explaining that in marital bargaining, “the ‘winner[]’ in one round get[s] a satisfactory outcome that would typically include not only more immediate beneﬁt but also a
better placing (and greater bargaining power) in the future”; that “ﬁnding more ‘productive’
employment . . . may . . . contribute not only to immediate well-being but also to acquired
skill and a better breakdown position for the future”; and that enhanced human capital that
one might get from a better job “improves one’s breakdown position, threat advantages, and
perceived contributions within the family, even when these may not have been conscious objectives”).
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losses—such as the wages from a job given up to trail a spouse—typically go
uncompensated.91
Moreover, redistribution within the family does not remedy the most concerning facet of the employment losses women suﬀer through mobility: the
employment losses themselves matter. Work brings unique beneﬁts, especially
for women, that cannot readily be compensated for in the family.92 Perhaps
most importantly, when it comes to the critical social goal of advancing sex
equality in the workplace, how resources are distributed within the family is
beside the point.
***
Note that the consequences of mobility, both inside and outside the family,
compound with repeat moves. Perhaps the aim of Schleicher’s proposal to
move people from low- to high-opportunity places is to situate people in locations with deep labor markets, which may make them less likely to move in the
future.93 But this is a signiﬁcant empirical assumption. Moving to a highopportunity place may lead people to become “moving” types who will be more
likely to move again.94 In any event, the costs discussed above must be factored
into the welfare and distributional consequences of mobility, even for a single
move.
While this Response questions whether the gains from mobility are as great
as Schleicher suggests, I stop short of claiming that the net costs of mobility
outweigh its beneﬁts. At the very least, the points raised about welfare and distribution suggest that the gains from mobility are distributed asymmetrically
(disproportionately to those who move rather than those le� behind, and to
husbands rather than wives), such that any thinking about mobility policy
must pay careful attention to distribution. Moreover, the relative costs and
beneﬁts of mobility will vary with the circumstances. Some moves (perhaps to

91.

See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT 120-23 (2000) (discussing how family law fails to account for gendered market
labor and carework dynamics within marriage upon divorce, either through property division or alimony).
92. See Schoenbaum, Coworkers, supra note 38, at 612-14 (explaining how work in general and
close coworker relationships in particular provide special reprieve from the demands of
family life, especially for women); Schoenbaum, Intimate Work, supra note 38, at 1182-83
(same vis-à-vis close worker-customer relationships); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000) (explaining how work is constitutive of citizenship, community, and personal identity, and citing studies linking work with higher self-esteem in
women).
93.

In prior work, I have been inclined towards deep labor markets myself for precisely this reason. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1231-35.

94.

See text accompanying supra note 72 for a discussion of diﬀerent moving types.
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escape an abusive partner, or to move to a smaller and happier city95) may
bring especially great beneﬁts. Some moves (perhaps for a young, single person) may impose fewer costs. I have intended to highlight the costs of mobility
so that those cra�ing policies that will impact location decisions will do so not
only considering the beneﬁts of mobility, but also its costs.
iii. the value of plac e
Like his view of the value of relationships, Schleicher also limits his view of
the value of place to economic productivity. In this regard, he might be overstating the value of big cities for bringing economic beneﬁts.96 But Schleicher
also ignores the impact of place for general welfare metrics, for politics, and for
other less quantiﬁable considerations. This Part addresses how Schleicher simultaneously over- and under-values place.
As to the economic beneﬁts of place, recent research calls into question the
wage gains resulting from moving to the types of big cities Schleicher hails.97
One key study suggests mobility has decreased due to declining wage returns
to job switching.98 Another study emphasizes the increased ﬂatness of the
American economy: “labor markets around the country have become more
similar in the returns they oﬀer to particular skills, so workers need not move
to a particular place to maximize the return on their idiosyncratic abilities.”99 So
while Schleicher is worried that the law is standing in the way of people in Mississippi moving to New York for labor market gains, at least some of the research suggests that people are not making these moves simply because these
gains do not exist to be had.100
And if the economic gains are uncertain, the costs—especially in terms of
higher housing costs—are not. Schleicher would fault restrictive housing and
zoning laws, among other policies, for the increased housing costs in certain
95.
96.

See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.

97.

See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 83-84 (citing the fact that “lower-skilled workers are not
moving to high-wage cities and regions” and positing that law and policy “keep[] people
out of the . . . best job markets”).
98. See Molloy et al., Declining Migration, supra note 11, at 2; Molloy et al., Job Changing and the
Decline in Long-Distance Migration in the United States, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 631, 643 (2017)
(ﬁnding that “changes in the labor market are driving the change in migration patterns, rather than vice versa”).
99. See Greg Kaplan & Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Understanding the Long-Run Decline in Interstate
Migration, NBER Working Paper No. 18507, at 1 (2013), http://www.nber.org/papers
/w18507.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y943-FSWH].
100.
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See sources cited supra notes 98-99.

stuck or rooted? the costs of mobility and the value of place

areas.101 But surely these laws alone are not to blame. Simple supply and demand would lead New York or Silicon Valley to be more expensive than Mississippi or Arkansas. There may be some set of persons for whom restrictive
housing and zoning laws make the marginal diﬀerence between rendering New
York or Silicon Valley aﬀordable or not. Schleicher does not suggest how large
a group this is, and the research suggests it is small or nonexistent.102
Think about these uncertain wage beneﬁts and certain costs for the hypothetical janitor that Schleicher suggests should be moving from Mississippi to
New York.103 The janitor is not likely to make much more money in New York
than in Mississippi, but he will have to pay far more in rent.104 Even as a simple
economic matter, the move starts to look far less appealing.
Some research also calls into doubt whether moving to the types of highopportunity places that Schleicher lauds will make people happier. One study
ﬁnds that the unhappiest counties in the United States are some of the densest,
and that the happiest counties are primarily rural or a mix of suburban and rural.105 Another study ﬁnds that larger cities are much less happy than smaller
ones.106 In general, the sixty cities in the United States with populations larger
than 300,000 people are the least happy cities in the country.107 This may mean
that precisely the factors that agglomerationists such as Schleicher celebrate for

101.

See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 114-117.
See Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity, supra note 11, at 221-22 (ﬁnding that housing and zoning regulations are not causing declines in mobility).
103. See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 83 (“Bankers and technologists continue to move from Mississippi or Arkansas to New York or Silicon Valley, but few janitors make similar
moves . . . .”).
102.

104.

It might be that agglomeration brings more beneﬁts for some occupations and industries
than others. Low-income workers may work disproportionately in occupations and industries that beneﬁt less from agglomeration.
105. Adam Okulicz-Kozaryn & Joan Maya Mazelis, Urbanism and Happiness: A Test of Wirth’s
Theory of Urban Life, 2016 URB. STUD. 1, 10 (analyzing data while controlling for the characteristics of cities themselves, like size and heterogeneity, to ﬁnd St. Louis, the Bronx, and
Kings County (Brooklyn) to be the least happy counties, and Douglas County, Colorado
(outside Denver), Shelby County, Tennessee (outside Memphis), and Johnson County,
Kansas (outside Kansas City) to be the happiest counties).
106. Adam Okulicz-Kozaryn, Unhappy Metropolis (When American City Is Too Big), 61 CITIES 144,
144-45, 148 (2017) (deﬁning happiness in terms of “subjective wellbeing,” which includes
both life satisfaction and one’s mood, and ﬁnding that happiness gradually increases as population size declines). The exception appears to be a large decline in happiness in communities of around 5,000 to 8,000 people. Id. at 146 ﬁg.2.
107.

Id.
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their impact on productivity—the density and size of cities—are precisely what
make people in them less happy.108
When it comes to city size, unhappiness increases when a city’s population
reaches hundreds of thousands of people.109 So, “a person does not have to give
up city living to be happy, she just needs to avoid the biggest cities.”110 Nonetheless, Schleicher tends to favor the biggest cities as producing more of the
beneﬁts of agglomeration.111 Note that one could accept the gains of agglomeration more generally without taking such a narrow view of where these gains
are generated, particularly considering the happiness tradeoﬀ that living in one
of the largest cities may entail.
A few caveats are in order. In the study connecting density to unhappiness,
the happiest counties were each near a large city, which may allow residents to
occasionally enjoy the beneﬁts of the city (like the amenities) without the
costs.112 And these studies show only a correlation between city living and
happiness, rather than a causal link. It may be that cities attract the types of
people who are less happy.113 But even if these studies simply reﬂect that diﬀerent types of people sort into diﬀerent types of places, this in itself is important
for Schleicher’s argument: cities may not be for everyone.
Indeed, precisely because people “ideologically sort into and out of diﬀerent
physically deﬁned communities,”114 moving people from some types of places
to other types of places has political implications. Going back to the Founding,
place-based political communities have been recognized as important for local

108.

Even controlling for factors correlated with density and size (the congestion costs of cities
such as poverty and stress, as well as race and political aﬃliation, among others), these studies continue to ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between city size and county density, on the one hand, and happiness, on the other. See id. at 152 ﬁg.2, 153 ﬁg.3; OkuliczKozaryn & Mazelis, supra note 105, at 6-10. Of course, other factors that were not controlled
for may also explain the results.
109. Okulicz-Kozaryn, supra note 106, at 144, 146.
110.

Id. at 148.
While Schleicher does not speciﬁcally address this issue, his consistent references to New
York and Silicon Valley suggest that he believes the real beneﬁts of agglomeration are to be
had in these cities on the east and west coasts, and that entire regions in the middle and
south of the country are less productive.
112. See Richard Florida, The Price of Happiness in Cities, CITYLAB.COM (June 27, 2016), http://
www.citylab.com/equity/2016/06/the-price-of-happiness-in-cities/487823 [http://perma.cc
/SP5P-H7U2].
111.

113.

See id. (explaining that cities, and especially dense urban neighborhoods, are home to people
who are “more introverted, introspective, . . . perhaps overly critical,” and “neurotic” than
are suburbs or rural areas, whereas suburbs and rural areas are home to “more agreeable and
conscientious types who tend to be happier with their lives”).

114.

Fontana, Geography, supra note 4, at 108.
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self-government.115 Large-scale relocation policies could threaten these communities.116 There is also the matter of how place intersects with federalism
and its beneﬁts, like allowing states to engage in policy experimentation.117 As
Schleicher sees it, variation in policy across states, rather than being a desirable
outgrowth of a federal system, hinders interstate mobility.118 Schleicher wants
to use mobility policy to “forg[e] a uniﬁed economy and people from our many
regions and groups.”119 This “political goal” fails to appreciate the nature of
separate political and ideological communities deﬁned by state borders as the
cornerstone of federalism.120 While there is surely disagreement over the role of

115.

Id. at 104.
116. Due to political spillovers and argument pools, once people are in a new location long
enough, they are likely to change. But this would mean the diminishment of the ideologies
of the places that people moved away from. See infra note 120 and accompanying text on the
importance of ideological communities.
117. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (praising state governments as the “laboratories” of democracy).
118. Schleicher cites state variation under Obamacare as one example. See Schleicher, supra note
6, at 126 & n.218. But the relationship between Obamacare and mobility is mixed. In theory,
variation in beneﬁt levels and eligibility might hinder mobility for those located in generous
states, or it might spur mobility to those states from less generous states. Schleicher says
that “if the higher taxes necessary to fund redistributive spending have any negative eﬀect
on employment, beneﬁt diﬀerentials should limit more moves than they encourage, ceteris
paribus.” Id. at 126 n.217. But this might not be so if employers make location decisions not
on the basis of taxes alone, but also based on local policies. We can see this type of employer
behavior in response to businesses leaving North Carolina a�er it limited transgender rights.
See David A. Graham, The Business Backlash to North Carolina’s LGBT Law, ATLANTIC (Mar.
25, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-backlash-to-northcarolinas-lgbt-non-discrimination-ban/475500 [http://perma.cc/Z8TF-68W6]. Schleicher
notes that “evidence that people moved to capture greater health beneﬁts following the expansion of Medicaid under the Aﬀordable Care Act is not strong.” Schleicher, supra note 6,
at 126 n.218. But this suggests that the health care law has not played much of a role in keeping people in place, either. Cf. David K. Ihrke, Carol S. Faber & William K. Koerber, Geographical Mobility: 2008 to 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 16 tbl.7 (2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20-565.pdf [http://perma.cc/FK4V-EESS] (explaining that 2% of people report moving from one county to another for health reasons).
119.
120.

Schleicher, supra note 6, at 154.
See Fontana, Geography, supra note 4, at 114-15 (documenting the empirical evidence of continuing relevance of geography for political communities); Ernest A. Young, The Volk of
New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal
System i–ii (Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2552866
[http://perma.cc/YXZ4-Z3HG] (“I conclude that reports of the death of state identity are
greatly exaggerated.”).
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diverse state identities in America,121 Schleicher does not address the tension
between his views and federalism.
We might recognize a range of other possible beneﬁts to maintaining a diverse array of place “types” in America. Writing about rural Oregon, Michelle
Wilde Anderson—another contributor to this Collection—has suggested several such beneﬁts, from preserving history and knowledge to making people
“spiritually and morally more whole through the existence of households and
environments beyond the hustle of urban materialism.”122 Schleicher questions
whether supporting residents to “remain adorable repositories of homespun
knowledge” is “something the rest of us value.”123
I would like to suggest that one way of coping with mortality is knowing
that there are things in this world that live beyond us. Preservation provides
value as much, if not more, for the feelings it generates in us about the kind of
society we live in than for whatever is preserved.124 Schleicher’s suggestion that
law should basically make places more destructible—say, for example, by allowing the construction of ﬂimsier buildings that can be torn down more easily125—poses problems for precisely this reason. We might think there are
measurable costs to such a proposal: that people will invest less in their homes
and communities if they are not built to last. Beyond this, it seems downright
strange to deny what is true for many people: that they have a relationship with
a place—o�en called a “home”—that is not merely accidental but is integral to
their identity and well-being, and to their cultural and political values.126 Given
121.

See Fontana, Geography, supra note 4, at 114 (describing the disagreement among scholars).
Of course, there are questions about how much federalism is desirable, whether the relevant
unit of geography is the state or something else (the city, the region, or another entity), and
whether there are better ways to achieve the same interests, but the considerations of federalism and the importance of geographic diversity should at least be acknowledged.
122. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The Western, Rural Rustbelt: Learning from Local Fiscal Crisis in
Oregon, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 465, 500 (2014).
123. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 145. He questions the value of historic preservation because it
does not “generally preserve or represent history as it was lived,” but rather “reﬂect[s] today’s majoritarian tastes about the past.” Id. at 144 n.293. Even if this is so, it may provide
utility for precisely this reason.
124. Cf. Anderson, supra note 122, at 500 (“To let Detroit depopulate and decline is to erode an
important heritage for current and future generations: our accountability to the values of
livable wage jobs, upward mobility, and American ingenuity it once stood for.”).
125.
126.

478

See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 135-36.
See, e.g., Jill Ann Harrison, Rust Belt Boomerang: The Pull of Place in Moving Back to a Legacy
City, 16 CITY & COMMUNITY 263 (2017) (exploring reasons behind “the growing trend of return migration of young professionals . . . to the [Rust Belt,]” and ﬁnding that these young
professionals made economically irrational decisions to move home because of attachments
to the social fabric of the community, as well as a desire to contribute to the revitalization of
the region).
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all this, we must ask whether we will really be better oﬀ if we live in a society
that treats place like any other market good, as something that is disposable
when its use value has diminished.127
conclusion
I conclude with a word about the title of this Response. When it comes to
mobility, Schleicher essentially divides people into two classes: the mobile, who
are able to accrue the beneﬁts of economic dynamism that come from mobility,
and, as his title suggests, the stuck, who suﬀer the costs of being trapped in
place. Richard Florida suggests a third category: “the rooted.”128 These are persons “who are strongly embedded in their communities and choose not to
[move].”129 While Florida expresses the crucial point that staying put has its
beneﬁts, his typology still misses something: the costs of mobility outlined in
this Response can aﬀect even the most mobile among us. Policymakers would
do well to pay close attention to the costs of mobility and the value of place for
everyone.
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